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T
he U.S. economy is currently experiencing a period of signifi-
cant financial stress. This stress has contributed to the down-
turn in the economy by boosting the cost of credit and making 
businesses, households, and financial institutions highly cautious. To 
alleviate the financial stress and counteract its effects on the economy, 
the Federal Reserve has reduced the federal funds rate target substan-
tially and undertaken unprecedented actions to support the function-
ing of financial markets. There will come a point, however, when the 
Federal Reserve needs to remove liquidity from the economy and un-
wind special lending programs to ensure a return to sustainable growth 
with low inflation. 
In past recoveries, the decision when to tighten policy was based 
mainly on the strength of business and consumer spending and the de-
gree of upward pressure on prices and wages. An additional element in 
the current exit strategy will be determining if financial stress is no longer 
high enough to endanger economic recovery. As financial conditions be-
gin to improve, the various measures of financial stress that the Federal 
Reserve monitors may give mixed signals. In this situation, policymak-
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ers would greatly benefit from having a single, comprehensive index of 
financial stress. Such an index could also prove valuable further down 
the road, when the Federal Reserve might again need to decide whether 
financial stress was serious enough to warrant special attention.
This article presents a new index of financial stress—the Kansas 
City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI). The article explains how the com-
ponents of the KCFSI capture key aspects of financial stress and shows 
that high values of the KCFSI have tended to coincide with known pe-
riods of financial stress. The article also shows that the KCFSI provides 
valuable information about future economic growth. 
The first section of the article discusses the key phenomena that 
economists generally associate with financial stress. The next section 
describes the set of financial variables selected to represent these fea-
tures of financial stress and explains how the variables are combined 
in the KCFSI. The third section examines the behavior of the KCFSI 
during past episodes of financial stress and explains how the index can 
be used to determine the severity of financial stress. The fourth section 
examines the link between the KCFSI and economic activity, includ-
ing the transmission of financial stress to economic activity through 
changes in bank lending standards. 
I.   KEY FEATURES OF FINANCIAL STRESS
In most general terms, financial stress can be thought of as an inter-
ruption to the normal functioning of financial markets. Agreeing on a 
more specific definition is not easy, because no two episodes of financial 
stress are exactly the same. Still, economists tend to associate certain 
key phenomena with financial stress. The relative importance of these 
phenomena may differ from one episode of financial stress to another. 
However, every episode seems to involve at least one of the phenomena, 
and often all of them.
Increased uncertainty about fundamental value of assets. One 
common sign of financial stress is increased uncertainty among lenders 
and investors about the fundamental values of financial assets. The fun-
damental value of an asset is the present discounted value of the future 
cash flows, such as dividends and interest payments. Increased uncer-
tainty about these fundamental values typically translates into greater 
volatility in the market prices of the assets. ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  7
In some cases, increased uncertainty about the fundamental values 
of assets reflects greater uncertainty about the outlook for the economy 
as a whole and for specific sectors. The prospective cash flows from 
stocks, bonds, and loans all depend on future economic conditions. As 
a result, heightened uncertainty about economic conditions can cause 
lenders and investors to become less sure of the present discounted val-
ues of these cash flows. Uncertainty about the fundamental values of 
financial assets can also increase when financial innovations make it 
difficult for lenders and investors to even assign probabilities to differ-
ent outcomes. This kind of uncertainty, in which risk is viewed as un-
known and unmeasurable, is often referred to as Knightian uncertainty. 
According to some economists, such uncertainty tends to arise when 
losses are incurred for the first time on a new financial instrument or 
practice—for example, complex structured products such as collateral-
ized debt obligations (CDOs) in the recent subprime crisis, or program 
trading in the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis of 1998. 
Lacking any historical experience on which to draw, investors may con-
clude in such situations that they cannot even form a judgment about 
the probabilities of returns to the new products.1 
Increased uncertainty about the fundamental values of assets leads 
to greater volatility in asset prices by causing investors to react more 
strongly to new information (Pastor and Veronesi; Hautsch and Hess). 
Suppose, for example, that the maximum price an investor is willing 
to pay for a firm’s stock depends on his estimate of the firm’s long-run 
profitability. Suppose also that the investor revises this estimate when-
ever he receives new information about the firm’s profit outlook. Then 
the greater the investor’s initial uncertainty about the firm’s long-run 
profitability, the more the investor will revise his estimate of the firm’s 
profitability in response to new information, and thus the more he will 
change his offer price in response to that information.2 Thus, increased 
uncertainty about the fundamental value of stocks will generally lead to 
increased volatility of the prices of those stocks. 
Increased uncertainty about behavior of other investors. Anoth-
er form of uncertainty that often increases during financial crises and 
contributes to asset price volatility is uncertainty about the behavior 
of other investors. For an asset that may need to be sold before ma-
turity, the expected return to an investor can depend as much on the 
actions of other investors as on the long-run or hold-to-maturity value 8  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
of the asset. Keynes made this point by comparing the stock market to 
a beauty contest in which a prize was rewarded for picking the face that 
the largest number of other people picked. In such situations, Keynes 
noted, the incentive of the individual is to anticipate “what average 
opinion expects average opinion to be.” This kind of recursive behavior 
becomes more prevalent when lenders and investors become more un-
certain about the fundamental values of assets. Thus, it tends to arise in 
the same situations as Knightian uncertainty—when investors discover 
that their assumptions about a new financial product or practice were 
incorrect and have little historical experience on which to base their 
new opinions.3
Like uncertainty about fundamentals, uncertainty about the be-
havior of other investors tends to show up in increased volatility of 
asset prices. When investors base their decisions on guesses about other 
investors’ decisions, prices of financial assets become less tied to funda-
mental values. Therefore, prices also become more volatile. 
Increased asymmetry of information. A third common sign of 
financial stress is an increased asymmetry of information between lend-
ers and borrowers or buyers and sellers of financial assets. Asymmetry 
of information is said to exist when borrowers know more about their 
true financial condition than lenders, or when sellers know more about 
the true quality of the assets they hold than buyers. Information gaps 
of this kind can lead to problems of adverse selection or moral hazard, 
boosting the average cost of borrowing for firms and households and 
reducing the average price of assets on secondary markets. Suppose, for 
example, that investors know the average risk of a group of firms issu-
ing bonds but cannot distinguish the high-quality firms in the group 
from the low-quality firms. Investors will then require a rate of interest 
on the bonds appropriate for a firm of average risk. But at such a rate, 
the higher-quality firms may prefer not to borrow and instead rely on 
internal funds. If so, an adverse selection problem will arise: The mix 
of firms selling bonds will worsen, leading investors to demand a still 
higher rate of return.4
Such asymmetries of information might worsen during a period of 
financial stress for two reasons. First, the variation in the true quality 
of borrowers or financial assets might increase (Mishkin; Gorton). Sup-
pose, for example, that everyone expects the collateral on a particular ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  9
type of loan to increase in value. Then lenders will view all loans of that 
type as safe, regardless of the borrower’s future income or profits. But 
now suppose everyone expects the value of the collateral to decline—
for example, because a real estate bubble has burst. Then loans to low-
income borrowers will have greater risk than loans to high-income bor-
rowers, because low-income borrowers will be less able to repay their 
loans if the value of the collateral falls below the amount due on the 
loan. Thus, if lenders have difficulty determining borrowers’ income, 
an asymmetry of information will arise—borrowers will differ in their 
true risk, and each borrower will have a better idea of that risk than 
lenders.5 The second way information asymmetries can worsen in a fi-
nancial crisis is through lenders losing confidence in the accuracy of their 
information about borrowers (Gorton). Suppose, for example, that the 
issuer of a bond knows its true risk of default, but that investors must rely 
on credit ratings by a third party to determine that risk. If investors sud-
denly come to doubt the objectivity of those ratings, they will become 
more uncertain as to which bonds are likely to repay and which are likely 
to default. Once again, an asymmetry of information will arise, with is-
suers of the bonds knowing more about their true risk than investors.6
Decreased willingness to hold risky assets (flight to quality). One 
common sign of financial stress is a sharply decreased willingness to 
hold risky financial assets. Such a change in preferences will cause lend-
ers and investors to demand higher expected returns on risky assets and 
lower returns on safe assets. These shifts in preferences away from risky 
assets and toward safe assets are often referred to as “flights to quality.” 
The result is to widen the spread between the rates of return on the two 
types of assets and increase the cost of borrowing for relatively risky 
borrowers (Caballero and Kurlat).  
What could cause lenders and investors to become much less will-
ing to hold risky assets? Some theories of financial crises emphasize 
the tendency for lenders and investors to underestimate risk during 
booms and overestimate risk during subsequent busts (Kindleberger; 
Minsky; Berger and Udell; Guttentag and Herring). According to this 
view, lenders and investors tend to become complacent during peri-
ods of prolonged economic stability and forget their previous losses. 
During such periods, investors are especially prone to ignore “fat-tail” 
risks—the non-negligible probability of extreme losses. However, be-10  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
cause such euphoria leads to some bad loans and investments, losses are 
eventually incurred. When lenders and investors realize that such losses 
are possible, their euphoria turns to gloom, causing them to swing in 
the opposite direction and overestimate the risk of loss. 
Another, quite different reason why lenders and investors may be-
come less willing to hold risky assets is that their appetite for risk falls. 
Suppose, for example, that people become more uncertain about the 
future state of the economy and thus more uncertain about their future 
wage income. They will then have more reason to worry about suf-
fering losses on risky investments when they can least afford them—
that is, when their income and consumption are already low due to 
a downturn in the economy. In such cases, lenders and investors will 
require greater compensation for holding risky assets, boosting returns 
on those assets relative to safe assets.7
Decreased willingness to hold illiquid assets (flight to liquidity). 
A final sign of financial stress is a sharply decreased willingness to hold 
illiquid assets. An illiquid asset is one that the owner cannot be confi-
dent of selling at a price close to its fundamental value if faced with a 
sudden and unexpected need for cash. In some cases, an asset is illiquid 
because the secondary market for the asset is thin, so that selling a 
substantial amount of the asset has a large effect on the price. In other 
cases, an asset may be illiquid because it is of above-average quality and 
an asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers prevents the 
owner from selling the asset at a price close to its fundamental value 
(for example, the value if the owner could hold it to maturity).8 During 
financial crises, investors typically become less willing to hold illiquid 
assets and more willing to hold liquid assets. The effect of these “flights 
to liquidity” is to widen the spread between the rates of return on the 
two types of assets and increase the cost of borrowing for those firms   
that issue illiquid securities.
A flight to liquidity can occur for two reasons–an increase in the 
demand for liquidity to protect against unexpected cash needs or a de-
crease in the perceived liquidity of some assets. To see how the demand 
for liquidity could increase, recall that one feature of financial stress is 
an increase in the volatility of asset prices. Such an increase in volatility 
raises the chances that a leveraged investor will have to liquidate some 
of his assets to meet margin calls (Brunnermeier and Pederson). An ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  11
increase in asset price volatility also increases the chances that finan-
cial intermediaries such as hedge funds and mutual funds will have to 
liquidate assets to meet redemptions.9 To guard against such events, 
investors and financial institutions will seek to build up their holdings 
of liquid assets. 
The other possible cause of a flight to liquidity is a reduction in 
the perceived liquidity of assets. As noted earlier, financial stress is of-
ten associated with greater asymmetry of information between buyers 
and sellers of financial assets. In such circumstances, adverse selection 
may cause the market values of some assets to fall well below their fun-
damental, hold-to-maturity values. Investors will view such assets as 
illiquid because they cannot be sold to raise cash without taking a sub-
stantial loss. 
II.   CONSTRUCTING AN OVERALL INDEX OF FINAN-
CIAL STRESS
The goal of this article is to construct an index capturing all the key 
features of financial stress discussed in the previous section. This section 
describes the variables included in the index and which features of finan-
cial stress are captured by each variable. The section then explains how 
the variables are combined into an overall index of financial stress. 
Variables included in the financial stress index
Several criteria were used in selecting variables for the KCFSI. First, 
each variable had to represent one or more of the five features of fi-
nancial stress. Second, each variable had to reflect prices or yields on 
financial markets, on the grounds that market prices and yields em-
body the largest amount of information and are the quickest to reflect 
changes in financial conditions. Third, each variable had to be available 
on at least a monthly basis, so that a monthly financial stress index 
could be constructed. And finally, each variable had to be available at 
least since 1990, in order to assess the ability of the KCFSI to identify 
past episodes of financial stress. These criteria led to the selection of 
11 variables, each of which is explained below. Table 1 summarizes the 
key features of financial stress captured by the variables. The table also 
reports the date at which each variable became available and the mean 12  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
and standard deviation of the variable from February 1990 through 
March 2009.
3-month  LIBOR/T-Bill  spread  (TED  spread).  The  3-month 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is a measure of the cost to 
banks of lending to each other over the short term. Each day, a panel of 
16 large banks report the rate at which they believe they could borrow 
unsecured, dollar-denominated funds on the interbank market. This 
rate could exceed the rate on a Treasury bill of the same maturity for 
two possible reasons—because lending banks fear the loan may not be 
repaid (default risk), or because banks worry they will experience an 
unexpected need for funds before the loan comes due (liquidity risk).10 
If lending banks have difficulty determining which borrowing banks 
are good risks and which are bad risks, a problem of adverse selec-
tion can also arise, further increasing the LIBOR/T-bill spread. Thus, 
the LIBOR/T-bill spread can capture three distinct aspects of financial 
stress—flight to quality, flight to liquidity, and asymmetry of informa-
tion between buyers and sellers of financial assets.11
2-year swap spread. In an interest rate swap, one party agrees to 
pay another party a stream of fixed-rate payments in return for a stream 
of floating-rate payments. The floating-rate payments are usually based 
on a short-term LIBOR rate. The fixed rate is often expressed as the 
yield on a Treasury security of the same maturity plus a spread over that 
yield. This spread is positive for two reasons (Grinblatt). First, as noted 
above, the LIBOR rate on which the floating-rate payments are based 
will generally exceed the comparable short-term Treasury yield, so that 
interbank lenders are compensated for the default and liquidity risk of 
interbank loans. As a result, an investor will agree to make floating-rate 
payments in return for fixed-rate payments only if he earns more than 
the comparable long-term Treasury yield on the fixed-rate payments. 
The second reason the swap spread is positive is that the claim to the 
fixed-rate payments is considerably less liquid than a Treasury security 
of the same maturity, which can always be sold on short notice on sec-
ondary markets. These explanations for the positive spread on interest 
rate swaps suggest that increases in the 2-year swap spread can reflect two 
different features of financial stress—flight to quality (fear that increased 
default risk in the interbank lending market will drive up LIBOR), or 
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or fear that increased liquidity risk in the interbank market will drive up 
LIBOR).12
Off-the-run/on-the-run 10-year Treasury spread. For a particular 
maturity, the on-the-run Treasury security is the most recently issued 
security of that maturity. Off-the-run Treasury securities are previously 
issued securities of the same maturity.13 The market for an off-the-run 
Treasury security is generally not as deep as the market for the on-the-
run security of the same maturity. As a result, an investor holding the 
off-the-run security faces more risk of having to sell the security at a 
discount if he needs cash in a hurry. To compensate for this liquidity 
risk, the yield on the off-the-run security must exceed the yield on the 
on-the-run security. The spread between the off-the-run and on-the-
run yields tends to increase when investors become more concerned 
about the risk of an unexpected need for cash. Thus, the spread pro-
vides a good measure of the flight to liquidity that often occurs during 
periods of financial stress.14
Aaa/10-year Treasury spread. Although corporate bonds rated 
Aaa by Moody’s are supposed to have little or no default risk, their 
yields are generally higher than those on Treasury securities of similar 
maturity. One reason Aaa bond yields can exceed comparable Treasury 
yields is that many of the bonds are callable, which means that the 
company that issued the debt can prepay the loan if a decline in interest 
rates makes refinancing attractive (Duca). However, another important 
reason for the difference in yields is that even the highest-rated corpo-
rate bonds tend to be less liquid than Treasury securities. As a result, in-
creases in the spread between Moody’s Aaa bond index and the 10-year 
Treasury yield provides another measure of the flight to liquidity dur-
ing periods of financial stress.
Baa/Aaa spread. Baa-rated corporate bonds are the lowest-rated 
bonds classified by Moody’s as investment-grade. During economic ex-
pansions, the yield on these bonds may exceed the yield on Aaa bonds 
by only a small margin, because investors perceive the risk of default to 
be almost as low on Baa bonds as Aaa bonds. However, if investors be-
come concerned about the state of the economy or the financial health of 
lower-rated corporations, they will assign a higher probability of default 
to Baa bonds. In such circumstances, the Baa yield will rise further above 
the Aaa yield to compensate investors for the higher perceived risk of ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  15
Baa bonds. Such an increase in the Baa/Aaa spread need not be a sign 
of financial stress if investors’ changed beliefs about default risk are well 
founded. But in some cases, the increased pessimism of investors may 
represent an over-reaction to a prolonged period of excessive optimism. 
And in other cases, investors may demand a higher yield on Baa bonds, 
not because of an increase in the perceived risk of Baa bonds, but because 
of a decreased willingness to bear such risk. Either way, the increase in 
the Baa/Aaa spread will reflect a flight to quality. During such periods, 
investors may also start to worry that some Baa bonds are riskier than 
others. If so, a problem of adverse selection may arise, causing the Baa 
rate to move even further above the Aaa yield.15 Thus, the Baa/Aaa spread 
may also capture increases in information asymmetries. 
High-yield bond/Baa spread. High-yield bonds, also known as 
“junk bonds,” are corporate bonds with too low a rating to be con-
sidered investment-grade. The difference in default risk between high-
yield bonds and Baa bonds is even greater than that between Aaa bonds 
and Baa bonds. As a result, there should be an even greater tendency for 
the high-yield/Baa spread to increase in response to a flight to quality or 
an increase in information asymmetry (Gertler and Lown).16 The high-
yield/Baa spread may also capture flights to liquidity (Kwan 2001). 
High-yield bonds tend to have thinner markets than investment-grade 
bonds, partly because they are issued in smaller quantities and partly 
because institutional investors such as pension funds are prohibited 
from investing in them. Thus, when investors become more worried 
about unexpected cash needs, the high-yield bond yield tends to rise 
further above the Baa yield to compensate investors for holding the 
less-liquid asset. 
Consumer ABS/5-year Treasury spread. Consumer asset-backed 
securities are securities backed by pools of credit card loans, auto loans, 
or  student  loans.  Like  mortgage-backed  securities,  these  securities 
are typically issued in tranches, with the senior tranche receiving the 
highest rating because it has first lien on the underlying loans (Getter; 
Furletti). During normal times, the senior tranches are considered to 
have low risk because the underlying loans are geographically diversi-
fied and thus unlikely to default at the same time. As a result, the spread 
over Treasury securities of comparable maturity is low. During flights to 
quality, however, investors may become more concerned about the risk 16  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
of default by consumers and require higher compensation to hold the 
securities, just as in the case of high-yield bonds. Asset-backed securi-
ties are also susceptible to increases in the asymmetry of information 
between the buyers and sellers of financial assets. Issuers of consumer 
asset-backed securities have an incentive to securitize only high-quality 
loans to preserve their long-run reputation (Calomiris and Mason). 
During periods of financial stress, however, some issuers may be tempt-
ed to retain the higher-quality loans on their balance sheets and secu-
ritize the lower-quality loans. Suspecting such behavior, investors may 
demand sharply higher yields on the asset-based securities. 
Correlation between returns on stocks and Treasury bonds. In 
normal times, the returns on stocks and government bonds are either 
unrelated or move together in response to changes in the risk-free dis-
count rate. In times of financial stress, however, investors may view 
stocks as much riskier than government bonds. If so, they will shift out 
of stocks into bonds, causing the returns on the two assets to move in 
opposite directions. A number of studies, some for the United States 
and some for other countries, confirm that the correlation between 
stock returns and government bond returns tends to turn negative dur-
ing financial crises (Andersson and others; Baur and Lucey; Connolly 
and others; Gonzalo and Olmo). Thus, the stock-bond correlation pro-
vides an additional measure of the flight to quality during periods of 
financial stress. This correlation is computed over rolling three-month 
periods using the S&P 500 and a 2-year Treasury bond index. Also, the 
negative value of the correlation is used in the KCFSI, so that increases 
in the measure correspond to increases in financial stress.
Implied volatility of overall stock prices (VIX). The CBOE Vola-
tility Index (VIX) is a measure of the expected volatility in the S&P 500 
based on the market prices of options. Options to buy or sell a stock 
are more valuable when the stock’s market price is expected to fluctuate 
widely, because the option has a greater likelihood of ending up “in the 
money.” For options to buy a stock, there will be a greater chance that 
the market price exceeds the strike price. And for options to sell the stock 
there will be a greater chance that the market price falls below the strike 
price. The VIX exploits this relationship between volatility and options 
prices to compute the expected upward or downward movement in the 
index over the next month. As a measure of overall volatility in stock ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  17
prices, it captures both uncertainty about the fundamental values of as-
sets and uncertainty about the behavior of other investors.
Idiosyncratic volatility of bank stock prices. Commercial banks 
play a key role in the financial system as sources of credit and liquidity 
to their customers. Thus, in measuring financial stress, it is useful to 
take into account volatility in bank stock prices as well as volatility in 
overall stock prices. The idiosyncratic volatility of bank stock prices is 
the volatility of the unexpected return to bank stocks—the portion of 
the return that cannot be explained by movements in the overall stock 
market. This measure is expressed as the standard deviation of unex-
pected daily returns during the month and is calculated from a bank 
stock index and the S&P 500 (Appendix A).17 The measure is designed 
to capture the same features of financial stress as the VIX, but for the 
banking industry rather than the corporate sector as a whole.
Cross-section dispersion of bank stock returns. If investors be-
come more uncertain about the relative quality of banks but each bank 
knows its own quality, the asymmetry of information between investors 
and banks will increase. One measure of investors’ uncertainty about 
relative quality is the cross-section dispersion in unexpected bank stock 
returns—the portion of each bank’s stock return that cannot be ex-
plained by movements in the overall market. The specific measure of 
dispersion used is the interquartile range of unexpected returns of the 
100 largest commercial banks. This measure is calculated using daily 
data on the S&P 500 and the stock prices of the 100 largest commercial 
banks (Appendix A).18
Combining the variables in an index of financial stress
The variables described above capture one or more features of fi-
nancial stress. As a result, the variables should have some tendency to 
move together as the degree of financial stress changes. However, each 
of the variables can also change for other reasons not directly related 
to financial stress. For example, even without any flight to quality, the 
high-yield bond/Baa spread could widen because investors expect a 
downturn in the economy that will boost default rates. Similarly, the 
Aaa/Treasury spread could widen, not because of a flight to liquidity, 
but because of an actual or projected decline in the supply of Treasury 
securities that depresses Treasury yields. Thus, while financial stress may 18  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
cause the variables to move together, other factors unrelated to financial 
stress may at times cause them to diverge. This possibility is confirmed 
by Table 2, which reports the correlation coefficient between each pair 
of variables from February 1990 to March 2009. The average correla-
tion coefficient is 0.57, implying that the 11 variables move together 
but not in lockstep.
How can the 11 variables be combined into an overall index of fi-
nancial stress? Financial stress is assumed to be the factor most respon-
sible for the co-movement of the variables. This factor is then identified 
by the method of principal components. The first step is to express each 
of the 11 variables in the same units by subtracting the sample mean 
(the number in the next-to-last column of Table 1) and dividing by the 
standard deviation (the number in the last column of Table 1). The next 
step is to calculate the coefficients of these variables in the index. These 
coefficients are chosen so that the index explains the maximum possible 
amount of the total variation in the 11 variables. The coefficients are also 
scaled so that the standard deviation of the index equals one.19
Table 3 shows the coefficients obtained by this method using data 
from February 1990 to March 2009. Since the variables have been stan-
dardized, the coefficient on each variable represents the effect on the 
index of a one-standard-deviation change in that variable. The coef-
ficients range from a low of 0.081 for the stock-bond correlation to 
0.130 for the VIX and consumer ABS spread. These differences may 
seem small, but they are economically important. They imply, for ex-
ample, that a one-standard-deviation change in VIX has one-and-a-half 
times as big an effect on the financial stress index as a one-standard-
deviation change in the stock-bond correlation. The last row in the 
table shows that 61.4 percent of the total variation in the 11 variables 
over the sample period is explained by the index. This number mea-
sures the tendency for the 11 variables to move together–a tendency 
that is assumed to result from each variable capturing a key feature of 
financial stress.20 The index itself is plotted in Chart 1. Not surprisingly, 
it has risen sharply in the current financial crisis. The behavior of the 
index during this episode and earlier periods of financial stress will be 
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Table 3
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS ON KCFSI VARIABLES
FEBRUARY 1990 TO MARCH 2009 
Variable Coefficient in KCFSI
TED spread 0.099




High-yield bond/Baa spread 0.124
Consumer ABS/Treasury spread 0.130
Stock-bond correlation 0.081
Stock market volatility (VIX) 0.129
Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) of banking industry 0.130
Cross-section dispersion (CSD) of bank stock returns 0.116
Memo: Percent of total variation of variables explained by KCFSI 61.4
Note: Each coefficient represents the effect of a one-standard-deviation change in the variable on the KCFSI.
Relation to other financial stress indexes
The financial stress index developed in this article is not the first of 
its kind, so it is important to see how it compares to the others (Table 
4). One of the first and most influential composite indexes of financial 
stress was developed by economists at the Bank of Canada (Illing and 
Liu). They explored several different ways of combining financial vari-
ables into a composite index, one of which was principal components. 
The Bank of Canada index includes a number of variables like those 
in the KCFSI, such as a corporate bond spread, a measure of liquidity 
in the Treasury market (the bid-ask spread), and a measure of volatility 
in the overall stock market. But the Bank of Canada index differs from 
the Kansas City Fed index in other important ways: It includes some 
variables, such as exchange rate volatility, that are more important for a 
small open economy like Canada’s than for the United States. It includes 
the slope of the yield curve, which likely reveals more about the stance of 
monetary policy than financial stress.21 And it fails to include any mea-
sures of investor uncertainty about bank stock prices. Most important, 
the Bank of Canada index is based on Canadian data, making it more 
useful for detecting financial stress in Canada than the United States.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  21
Chart 1
KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX (KCFSI)
Another composite index of financial stress that has attracted wide-
spread attention is one developed by economists at the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). In contrast to the Kansas City Fed and Bank 
of Canada indexes, the IMF index does not use principal components 
to determine the coefficients on the variables. Instead, the variables 
are standardized and assigned equal weights. The IMF index uses a 
somewhat smaller set of variables than the Kansas City Fed and Bank 
of Canada indexes, because the goal of the project was to construct an 
index that could be used for 17 different countries. Most of the vari-
ables in the IMF index closely resemble those in the Bank of Canada 
index. However, the IMF index differs by including a measure of stress 
in the interbank lending market and omitting any measure of liquidity 
in the government securities market. Though useful for international 
comparisons, the limited number of variables in the IMF index means 
that it may be less suited than the KCFSI for detecting financial stress 
in the United States.
Besides the composite indexes described above, a number of indexes 
have been developed to capture a particular aspect of financial stress. 
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One such index represents changes in investors’ risk appetite by changes 
in the cross-section relationship between risk and return on financial as-
sets (Kumar and Persaud). Another index measures the fragility of the 
banking system by the average probability of bank failure, using infor-
mation on the volatility of bank stock prices to estimate the “distance 
to default” (Carlson and others). Such indexes can be informative. But 
because they focus on a single aspect of financial stress, they are less use-
ful in assessing the overall level of stress than composite indexes such as 
the Bank of Canada, IMF, and Kansas City Fed indexes.22
III.   USING THE INDEX TO IDENTIFY FINANCIAL STRESS
A major objective of a financial stress index is to help policymakers 
determine whether financial stress is high enough to be a serious con-
cern. This section evaluates the performance of the KCFSI in identify-
ing past episodes of financial stress. The section then discusses how the 
KCFSI could be used to identify high financial stress in the future. 
Ability of the index to identify past episodes of financial stress
The first step in assessing the historical performance of the KCFSI 
is to see if peaks in the index always occurred in known periods of 
financial stress. Chart 1 shows that the KCFSI has reached high levels 
during three separate periods—the 1990-91 recession, the extended pe-
riod from fall 1998 to fall 2002, and the credit crisis that began in the 
summer of 2007. Each of these periods will be considered in turn.
Table 4
SUMMARY OF OTHER FINANCIAL STRESS INDEXES 
Index Variables Method of construc-
tion of index 
Country
Illing and Liu  Rolling beta for banking industry, 
exchange rate volatility, corporate bond 
spread, covered Canada-U.S. interest 
rate differential, stock market volatility, 
Treasury bid-ask spread, commercial 




Rolling beta for banking industry, 
exchange rate volatility, TED spread,  
corporate bond spread, percent decline in 
overall stock index, stock market volatil-
ity, slope of yield curve
Unweighted average of 
standardized variables
17 countriesECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  23
1990-91 recession. The first peak in the KCFSI occurred in Decem-
ber 1990-January 1991, during the late stages of the 1990-91 reces-
sion. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 had led to a spike 
in oil prices, increasing uncertainty and decreasing the appetite for risk 
among investors (Board of Governors 1991, p. 159). As a result, credit 
spreads widened and volatility in stock prices increased sharply. The be-
ginning of armed conflict between the United States and Iraq in Janu-
ary appeared to resolve much of the uncertainty, and the index quickly 
subsided.23
1998-2002. The period from October 1998 to October 2002 was 
unusual, in that the KCFSI attained six distinct peaks within a rela-
tively short time span. This period is shown separately in Chart 2, so 
that the peaks can be more clearly distinguished. 
The October 1998 peak followed close on the heels of the Russian 
debt moratorium in August and the bailout of the hedge fund Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM) in September (Board of Gover-
nors 1999, pp. 19- 23). The Russian default aroused concerns about 
other emerging country debt, sparking a flight to quality and liquidity 
in financial markets throughout the world. Financial stress then inten-
sified in the United States when heavy losses at LTCM prevented the 
firm from meeting liquidity demands by creditors and counterparties. 
Quick action by policymakers to resolve the LTCM crisis and assist 
troubled emerging countries helped calm markets, causing the KCFSI 
to gradually subside.
The KCFSI next peaked in October 1999, amid intense concern 
about the approach of Y2K (Board of Governors 2000, p. 18). Most of 
the increase in the index during this period was due to deterioration in 
liquidity measures, as credit spreads remained little changed. Concerns 
about Y2K abated as year-end approached and it became clear that 
adequate preparations had been made. As a result, the KCFSI turned 
back downward. 
The KCFSI reached two separate peaks in 2000. These increases are 
perhaps the hardest to explain in terms of financial stress. The first peak 
in April-June coincided with the bursting of the bubble in technology 
stocks. But that event had more effect on Nasdaq than on the broader 
stock market. The second peak was in December 2000, when there 
were no obvious explanations for increased financial stress other than 24  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
the approach of recession. A factor unrelated to financial stress that may 
have boosted the KCFSI in 2000 was the expectation that the federal 
government would run large structural budget surpluses, decreasing the 
supply of Treasury securities. This expectation put downward pressure 
on Treasury yields, increasing some of the interest rate spreads in the 
index (Board of Governors, 2000, p. 20).
The next peak of the KCFSI, in September 2001, is easier to ex-
plain because it coincided with the terrorist attacks. High-yield bond 
spreads had been high all year due to the recession. Immediately fol-
lowing the terrorist attacks, stock price volatility and liquidity premi-
ums also increased, producing the spike in the KCFSI. However, this 
episode was similar to the one in 1990, in that financial stress subsided 
quickly once investors realized that the economy would not suffer as 
much from the attacks as initially feared.
The last peak of the KCFSI during the 1998-2002 period was in 
October 2002. Financial stress during this period can be attributed to 
mounting investor concern about the accuracy of corporations’ finan-
cial statements. This concern began with the failure in December 2001 
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Note: Index is calculated using data from February 1990 to March 2009. Shaded area is a recession.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  25
of the energy trading firm, Enron, which had falsified its accounts to 
exaggerate its earnings. The concern intensified as the year went on, 
as other large companies such as WorldCom also admitted overstat-
ing their earnings. These revelations increased uncertainty about the 
financial condition of the corporate sector, leading to greater volatility 
in stock prices. The revelations also made it harder for investors to dis-
tinguish between good and bad companies, increasing the asymmetry 
of information in debt and equity markets.
Current crisis. Not surprisingly, the biggest increases in the KCFSI 
have occurred during the current crisis. While a full discussion of the 
crisis is beyond the scope of this article, it is instructive to see how the 
index changed as the crisis progressed.24 Chart 3 identifies the months 
in which the largest increases in the KCFSI occurred and lists some 
well-known events that might have contributed to the increases.25
The first signal from the KCFSI of increased financial stress was in 
August 2007. Investors had already showed concern about the qual-
ity of supbrime mortgages. These concerns increased when the rating 
agencies downgraded a number of structured mortgage products and 
the French bank BNP Paribas suspended redemptions for several of its 
investment funds. The next upturn in the KCFSI came in November 
2007, when major banks announced writedowns of mortgage prod-
ucts and rating agencies downgraded some of the monoline insurers 
guaranteeing these products.26 The KCFSI rose again in March 2008, 
during the turmoil surrounding the Bear Stearns collapse. The index 
subsided for awhile but then turned back up in July, when IndyMac 
Bank failed and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac showed considerable 
signs of trouble. 
The KCFSI confirms that financial stress took a sharp turn for the 
worse in the fall of 2008. The index recorded its largest increase ever in 
the month of September, when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, 
AIG was rescued, and two large troubled banks were absorbed by other 
banks after intervention by regulators. An even bigger increase in the 
index followed in October, as the previous month’s events took their 
toll and the political stalemate over TARP undermined confidence. The 
KCFSI has retreated since then. By March 2009, however, the index 
was still more than three times greater than any of the peaks in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, the last period of financial stress.26  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The above review of the behavior of the KCFSI since 1990 confirms 
that peaks in the index have almost always occurred during known 
episodes of financial stress. But another important question is whether 
there have been any well-recognized periods of financial stress in which 
the KCFSI has not increased. In other words, to be a good measure of 
financial stress, the KCFSI should not only have few false positives, but 
also have few false negatives. A careful review of other authors’ lists of 
financial crises in the United States and other developed countries re-
veal only two episodes that might have been highly stressful but are not 
captured by the KCFSI—the Mexican peso crisis of late 1994 and the 
Asian financial crisis in the summer of 1997.27 During both episodes, 
the KCFSI remained below zero. However, these crises were mainly 
international in nature with relatively little spillover to U.S. financial 
markets. As a result, the crises could be expected to have less effect on 
financial stress in the United States than in countries more closely tied 
to international capital markets.
Chart 3
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How the index could be used to identify future financial stress
In a period such as the fall of 2008, a financial stress index like the 
KCFSI may be so high that everyone agrees financial stress is a serious 
concern. At other times, however, it may not be so obvious whether the 
index is high enough to be a major concern. There are three possible 
ways to tackle this problem. 
The approach of the Bank of Canada and IMF is to classify fi-
nancial stress as severe when the index exceeds the historical mean by 
a certain number of standard deviations. The Bank of Canada uses a 
relatively high cutoff of two standard deviations above the mean, while 
the IMF employs a lower cutoff of one standard deviation above the 
mean.28 One problem with this approach is that the number of stan-
dard deviations by which the index exceeds the mean on a given date 
can change drastically as observations are added to the sample. As a 
result, a month could be classified as one of high financial stress before 
the addition of the new observations, but as a month with low financial 
stress after the addition of the new observations. Consider, for example, 
the month of October 1998, when financial stress was very high due 
to the Russian debt default and the LTCM crisis. When the KCFSI is 
estimated using only data through June 2007, the index has a value of 
2.6 standard deviations in October 1998, putting it well above both the 
Bank of Canada and IMF thresholds for high financial stress. However, 
when the KCFSI is estimated using data all the way through March 
2009, the index is only 1.2 standard deviations above zero in Octo-
ber 1998, putting it above the IMF cutoff but well below the Bank of 
Canada cutoff.29
A second way to decide if the KCFSI is high enough to be a serious 
concern is to establish a cutoff in terms of percentiles. For example, 
the index for a particular month could be classified as high if it fell 
in the 90th percentile for the entire sample—that is, if the index for 
that month was greater than or equal to the index in 90 percent of all 
the months in the sample. An advantage of this approach is the well-
known statistical fact that adding extreme observations has much less 
effect on the 90th percentile of a sample—or any other percentile of 
the sample—than on the standard deviation of the sample. As a result, 
the addition of extreme observations is less likely to cause a month to 28  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
switch from being classified as high stress to being classified as low stress 
when the sample is changed.30
A final approach is to classify the KCFSI as high whenever it equals 
or exceeds the value of the index in some benchmark episode, such as 
the Russian default and LTCM crisis (October 1998) or the Enron/
WorldCom accounting scandals (October 2002). This approach has the 
advantage of being even less affected than the percentile method by the 
addition of observations with extreme values of the KCFSI to the sam-
ple. Suppose, for example, that a particular month has a lower KCFSI 
than October 1998 using data up to the present. Then that month is 
likely to still have a lower KCFSI than October 1998 using data avail-
able a year from now, no matter how extreme the observations are in 
the interim.31 Comparing the KCFSI to some benchmark episode such 
as the Russian debt default and LTCM crisis also has the advantage of 
being more intuitive than the other two approaches. Many users of the 
KCFSI will find it useful to know if the index is higher than in some 
previous financial crisis with which they are familiar. They are less likely 
to be interested in how many standard deviations above the mean the 
index lies, or what percentile of all observations the index represents. 
Based on the above discussion, how might the KCFSI be used to 
assess financial stress in the current crisis? As shown in Chart 1, the 
KCFSI has fallen considerably from its peak in the fall of 2008. How-
ever, the index is still much higher than before the crisis and much 
higher than in any previous episode of financial stress since 1990. Un-
der a strict standard, financial stress could be judged to no longer be a 
serious concern once the KCFSI had returned to the same level as in 
July 2007, before the crisis began. Under a looser standard, financial 
stress could be judged to no longer be a serious concern once the index 
had fallen below its level in October 1998 and October 2002, when 
financial stress was high but the economy still grew briskly. Finally, it is 
not only the level of the index that matters, but also the length of time 
over which the index remains at that level. The peaks in the KCFSI in 
October 1998 and October 2002 were both short-lived. If the KCFSI 
fell to these levels but then stayed there, there would obviously be more 
reason for concern than if the index continued to trend downward.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  29
 IV.  THE  LINK  BETWEEN  FINANCIAL  STRESS  AND   
ECONOMIC ACTIVTY
Previous sections of this article have explained how the KCFSI cap-
tures financial stress and how the index can be used to determine if 
financial stress is high. The implicit assumption was that high levels of 
financial stress can be harmful to the economy. This section explores 
the principal basis for such concerns, which is that high financial stress 
can lead to reductions in economic activity. The section first discusses 
the various channels through which financial stress can affect economic 
activity. The section then examines the empirical relationship between 
the KCFSI and a monthly index of national economic activity to see if 
increases in financial stress have tended to be followed by decreases in 
economic growth.
Ways in which financial stress can affect economic activity
An increase in financial stress can lead to a decline in economic 
activity through three possible channels. The first channel is an increase 
in uncertainty about the prices of financial assets and the economic out-
look in general. Section I noted that financial stress is associated with 
two kinds of uncertainty—uncertainty about the fundamental value of 
assets and uncertainty about the behavior of other investors. Both kinds 
of uncertainty lead to increased volatility in asset prices. Empirical stud-
ies have shown that such volatility tends to cause firms to become more 
cautious, delaying important hiring and investment decisions until the 
uncertainty is resolved (Bloom). The volatility may also cause house-
holds to cut back on spending, as they become more uncertain about 
their future wealth. To the extent businesses and households do react in 
this way, real economic activity will fall.
The second channel through which increased financial stress can af-
fect economic activity is through increases in the cost to businesses and 
households of financing spending. Flight to quality, flight to liquidity, 
and increased asymmetry of information all have the effect of boosting 
interest rates on business and consumer debt in the capital markets. In 
addition, financial stress can make it more expensive for firms to raise 
funds by issuing new equity. Such increases in the cost of finance may 
cause businesses and households to cut back on their spending, depress-
ing economic activity still further.30  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The last way financial stress can lead to a slowing of economic ac-
tivity is by causing banks to tighten their credit standards. The same 
factors that cause investors to demand higher returns on debt and eq-
uity during periods of financial crisis may make banks less willing to 
lend. In such situations, banks tend to cut back on lending in two 
ways. First, they raise the interest rate charged on new loans, making 
it less attractive to borrowers to take out loans. Such an increase in 
loan rates should have the same effect on spending by businesses and 
households as an increase in the cost of credit on capital markets. As a 
result, this effect can be considered part of the cost-of-credit channel 
discussed above. Second, banks raise their minimum credit standards, 
making it harder for borrowers to qualify for loans. Such a tightening of 
credit standards may lead to an additional decline in spending, beyond 
that caused by the increase in loan rates (Lown and Morgan). Thus, 
it constitutes a third channel through which financial stress can affect 
economic activity—one that may be just as important as increased un-
certainty and increased cost of credit. 
As noted earlier, the KCFSI is based entirely on interest rates and 
prices in capital markets. As a result, the index cannot directly cap-
ture any tightening of bank credit standards due to increased financial 
stress. However, independent information on the tightening of bank 
credit standards is available from the Federal Reserve’s quarterly Senior 
Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS). As shown in the accompany-
ing box, high values of the KCFSI have tended to either coincide with 
or precede tighter credit standards over the last 20 years. This evidence 
suggests that changes in credit standards provide an additional channel 
through which financial stress may affect economic activity.
Direct evidence on the link between the KCFSI and economic activity 
A useful measure of monthly economic activity is the Chicago Fed’s 
National Activity Index (CFNAI). This index combines a large num-
ber of monthly indicators for employment, production, and spending 
into an overall measure of economic activity in the same way that the 
KCFSI combines a variety of financial indicators into an overall mea-
sure of financial stress. The CFNAI has been shown to have desirable 
properties as a macroeconomic indicator, including the ability to pre-
dict changes in inflation.32ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  31
FINANCIAL STRESS AND CHANGES IN 
CREDIT STANDARDS
 
The chart below compares the KCFSI with a measure of the 
tightening of credit standards from the Federal Reserve’s Senior 
Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS). Each quarter, the SLOOS 
reports the net percentage of banks that said they tightened credit 
standards over the previous three months. The lighter line in the 
chart shows this percentage for commercial and industrial (C&I) 
loans to large firms. The heavy line shows the quarterly average of 
the KCFSI. The chart suggests that the financial stress index and 
SLOOS measure have tended to move together since 1990. This 
tendency is most evident around the three recessions, but it also 
shows up in late 1998 near the time of the Russian debt default 
and LTCM collapse. The contemporaneous correlation coefficient 
between the two measures is 0.80—both for the sample ending 
in 2009:Q1 and the sample ending in 2008:Q2, before the sharp 
increase in the KCFSI. 
KCFSI  VS. CHANGE IN CREDIT STANDARDS 
ON C&I LOANS
 
Note: Change in credit standards is for C&I loans to large businesses. Shaded areas are recessions.
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Regression of credit standards on lagged values of credit standards and KCFSI
Does KCFSI help predict credit standards? Yes
Sum of coefficients on KCFSI   7.95
p-value for test that sum equals zero  .000
Regression of KCFSI on lagged values of KCFSI and credit standards 
Do credit standards help predict KCFSI? No
Sum of coefficients on credit standards   -.003
p-value for test that sum equals zero .460
Memo: Number of lags 1
PREDICTION  TESTS  FOR  KCFSI  AND  CREDIT   
STANDARDS 1990:Q4 to 2008:Q2
Note: Quarterly averages are used for the KCFSI, which is calculated with data through 2008:Q2.  The 
number of lags was chosen by the Schwartz criterion. One variable helps predict the other if the p-value for 
the test that all the coefficients on lagged values of the first variable are equal to zero is less than .01.
The table below presents standard statistical tests of the lead-lag 
relationship between the KCFSI and SLOOS measure. In these tests, 
each variable is regressed on lagged values of itself and lagged values 
of the other variable. The tests indicate that the KCFSI provides 
information about future changes in credit standards, but changes 
in credit standards do not provide information about future levels 
of the KCFSI. Put another way, the KCFSI tends to lead changes in 
credit standards, but not the other way around. Taken together, the 
chart and table confirm that high values of the KCFSI either coin-
cide with or precede tighter credit standards.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  33
The KCFSI and CFNAI are plotted in Chart 4 for the period 
1990-2009. Because the CFNAI is somewhat choppy on a month-to-
month basis, a three-month moving average is used for both indexes. 
The CFNAI and KCFSI show a strong negative correlation, moving in 
opposite directions throughout the period. The negative relationship 
is especially pronounced in late 2008, when financial stress spiked and 
the recession deepened. Even before then, however, the KCFSI and 
CFNAI show a strong tendency to move in opposite directions. Specifi-
cally, the contemporaneous correlation between KCFSI and CFNAI is 
-0.52 for the period ending in August 2008, versus -0.72 for the period 
ending in March 2009.33
While there is clearly a negative relationship between KCFSI and 
CFNAI, it is not easy to tell whether one variable provides information 
about future values of the other variable. Table 5 provides evidence on 
this issue. Each variable is regressed on lagged values of itself and lagged 
values of the other variable. The tests are performed for the period end-
ing in August 2008, so that the results are not influenced by the huge 
spike in KCFSI and drop in CFNAI in the fall of 2008. The results 
Chart 4
KCFSI VS. CHICAGO FED NATIONAL ACTIVITY INDEX 
(CFNAI)
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indicate that KCFSI helps predict CFNAI, but that CFNAI does not 
help predict KCFSI. The tests also show that increases in KCFSI tend 
to lead to decreases in CFNAI, as expected. Specifically, the sum of 
coefficients on lagged values of KCFSI is negative and statistically sig-
nificant in the regression for CFNAI. This result contrasts with the 
regression for KCFSI, in which the sum of coefficients on lagged values 
of CFNAI is close to zero and statistically insignificant.
The finding that KCFSI helps predict CFNAI is as expected. It sup-
ports the view that financial stress can slow economic activity through 
some combination of increased uncertainty, increased cost of finance, 
and tighter credit standards. To provide some idea of the possible mag-
nitude of this effect, Chart 5 shows the impulse response function for a 
shock to financial stress. The impulse response is the estimated change 
in CFNAI following a one-standard-deviation shock to KCFSI, based 
on the regressions for CFNAI and KCFSI in Table 5.34 The shaded area 
represents the 95 percent confidence band for the estimate. As indi-
cated by the solid line, the shock to KCFSI leads to a decline in CFNAI 
of 0.1 standard deviation within the first six months. After that point, 
CFNAI gradually returns to its initial value. The decline in CFNAI is 
significantly different from zero, as indicated by the fact that the confi-
dence band lies entirely below zero.
Table 5
PREDICTION  TESTS  FOR  KCFSI  AND  CHICAGO  FED   
NATIONAL ACTIVITY INDEX
April 1990 to August 2008
Regression of CFNAI on lagged values of CFNAI and KCFSI
Does KCFSI help predict CFNAI? Yes
Sum of coefficients on KCFSI   -.154
p-value for test that sum equals zero .000
Regression of  KCFSI on lagged values of KCFSI and CFNAI 
Does CFNAI help predict KCFSI? No
Sum of coefficients on CFNAI   -.014
p-value for test that sum equals zero .763
Memo: Number of lags 2
Note: The number of lags was chosen using the Schwartz criterion.  One variable helps predict the other if the 
p-value for the test that all the coefficients on lagged values of the first variable are equal to zero is less than .01.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  35
Chart 5
RESPONSE OF CFNAI TO SHOCK TO KCFSI
Note: Assumes a one-standard-deviation shock to KCFSI. The assumed ordering is (CFNAI, KCFSI). KCFSI is 
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 Is the impact of financial stress on economic activity shown in 
Chart 5 large enough to be economically significant? According to the 
Chicago Fed, recessions typically occur when the CFNAI falls 0.7 stan-
dard deviation below its average value of zero. It follows that that the 
KCFSI would have to rise about seven standard deviations above zero 
to cause a recession. Such a high level of financial stress may seem too 
unlikely to worry about. However, the index reached 5.6 standard de-
viations last October, not too far from the critical level. Furthermore, 
even if stress is not high enough to cause a recession by itself, it may 
be more than high enough to do so in combination with other adverse 
shocks, such as a jump in oil prices or drop in home prices.35
V.   CONCLUSIONS
The current credit crisis has underscored the importance of under-
standing and measuring financial stress. This article has introduced a 
new measure of financial stress—the Kansas City Financial Stress Index 36  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
(KCFSI). This measure is a based on 11 financial market variables, each 
of which captures one or more key features of financial stress. The KCF-
SI was shown to perform well in identifying widely recognized episodes 
of financial stress over the last 20 years. The index was also shown to do 
a good job in this period of anticipating changes in economic activity. 
Going forward, these findings suggest that the KCFSI can be a use-
ful tool in the Federal Reserve’s exit strategy for the current crisis. The 
decision when to remove liquidity from the economy and unwind special 
lending programs will be based in large part on the strength of business 
and consumer spending and the amount of upward pressure on wages 
and prices. However, in deciding when to tighten, it will also be useful 
for policymakers to know if financial stress no longer poses a threat to 
economic recovery. This article has not tried to define a critical level of 
the KCFSI above which financial stress is a serious concern and below 
which it is not. However, the article has suggested that policymakers can 
still gain insight into the seriousness of financial stress by comparing the 
current value of the KCFSI to its value in widely recognized episodes of 
financial stress in the past. In particular, a sustained decline in the index 
below levels in the LTCM crisis of 1998 or the accounting scandals of 
2002 would indicate that policymakers can focus more heavily on tradi-
tional indicators of economic activity and inflation.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  37
APPENDIX A
This appendix provides further details on the 11 variables included 
in the KCFSI. Sources for each variable are given in Table A.1. The sec-
ond column of the table indicates the primary source, while the third 
column indicates the source from which the data was obtained. Three 
of the variables were calculated by the authors as described below.
Correlation between returns on stocks and Treasury bonds. The 
stock-bond correlations are computed using rolling three-month win-
dows. The Merrill-Lynch total return index for 2-year Treasury notes is 
used for bonds, and the S&P 500 total return index is used for stocks. 
In both cases, the daily total return is measured as the log difference 
in the total return index. For each month, the business day closest to 
the 15th is selected. The correlation coefficient between daily bond and 
stock returns is then computed using the 66 business days leading up 
to and including the chosen day.
Idiosyncratic volatility of the banking industry. For each month, 
the idiosyncratic volatility of bank stock prices is derived in three steps. 
The first step is to estimate a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
regression of the daily return on the bank stock index published by 
SNL Financial against the daily return on the S&P 500 index, using 
data for the previous 12 months. For each index, daily returns are mea-
sured as the log difference in the total-return index. The second step 
is to use the estimated coefficients from the CAPM regression and the 
daily returns on the S&P 500 to calculate the residual return on the 
SNL bank stock index for each day of the month. The last step is to 
calculate the standard deviation of these daily residual returns for the 
current month.
Cross-section dispersion of bank stock returns. The cross-section 
dispersion of bank stock prices is computed using daily data for the 
100 largest commercial banks. For each month, the dispersion measure 
is calculated in four steps. The first step is to choose the 100 largest 
commercial banks in terms of market value and estimate a CAPM re-
gression of the daily return on each bank’s stock index against the daily 
return on the S&P 500 index, using data for the previous 12 months. 
As before, daily returns are measured as the log difference in the total-
return index. In the second step, the estimated coefficients from the 
bank-level CAPM regressions and the daily returns on the S&P 500 38  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
are used to calculate the residual return for each bank for each day of 
the current month. The third step is to add the daily residual returns to 
obtain the monthly residual return for each bank. The last step is to cal-
culate the interquartile range for these monthly residual returns—the 
difference between the top and bottom quartiles. The daily stock price 
data were taken from CRSP for the period through December 2008 
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APPENDIX B
This appendix explores the potential for instability in the KCFSI. 
As new observations are added to the sample, values of KCFSI in the 
original sample can change. This kind of instability would be trou-
bling if the changes in KCFSI for past months were big enough to alter 
the classification of a month as high-stress. This appendix investigates 
the issue by examining the impact on the KCFSI of a specific sample 
change—the extension of the sample from June 2007, prior to the start 
of the current crisis, to March 2009. The appendix concludes from this 
example that the instability problem can be mitigated by comparing 
the KCFSI to its value in some benchmark episode of financial stress, as 
suggested in Section III. 
Impact of the sample change on past values of the KCFSI. Chart 
B.1 shows the effect of the sample change on values of the KCFSI in the 
original sample. The heavy line shows the index for the sample period 
February 1990-June 2007, while the lighter line shows the index for the 
sample period February 1990-March 2009. The main effect of the sam-
ple change was to significantly reduce the KCFSI in those months in 
which the index was initially high. However, the index fell by a similar 
proportion in these months, leaving the relative position of the months 
little changed. The other impact of the sample change was to slightly 
increase the KCFSI in those months in which the index was initially 
negative and very low. 
Reasons for the change in past values of the KCFSI. In general, a 
sample change can alter values of the index in the original sample either 
by changing the coefficients on the variables in the index or by chang-
ing the values of the variables in the original sample. The change in the 
coefficients can be due either to a change in their overall magnitude or 
to a change in their relative magnitudes. The change in the values of the 
variables in the original sample is due to the fact that each variable is 
standardized in the principal components procedure—the sample mean 
is subtracted from the raw value of the variable and the result is then 
divided by the sample standard deviation. As new months are added to 
the sample, the sample mean and sample standard deviation of a vari-
able can change, especially if the new observations are extreme, as in the 
case of the credit crisis. But if the sample mean and sample standard ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  41
deviation of a variable change, so too will the standardized values of the 
variables in the original sample.36 
For the specific sample change under consideration—the addition 
of the 18 months from July 2007 to March 2009—the most impor-
tant source of change in past values of KCFSI was changes in the stan-
dardized values of the variables.37 This change was due to unusually 
high levels of most of the variables during the credit crisis. These high 
levels raised both the sample means and sample standard deviation of 
the variables, decreasing their standardized values in those months in 
the original sample when the variables were initially positive and high. 
These decreases in the standardized values of the variables led in turn 
to the decreases in KCFSI shown in Chart B.1. The next most im-
portant source of change in past values of the KCFSI was a change in 
the overall magnitude of the coefficients. Not surprisingly, the variables 
making up the KCFSI had a much greater tendency to move together 
during the credit crisis: The KCFSI explains 61.4 percent of the total 
variation in the variables in the new sample period, versus 42.6 percent 
in the original sample. In the principal components procedure, such 
an increase in the proportion of total variation explained by the index 
requires a scaling down of all the coefficients of the variables in order 
to keep the standard deviation of the index equal to one.38 The least 
important source of change in past values of KCFSI was changes in the 
relative magnitudes of the coefficients. The sample change raised the 
coefficients on the TED, Baa/Aaa, and consumer ABS spreads relative 
to the coefficients on the other variables. On the whole, however, these 
changes had much less impact on the KCFSI than changes in the stan-
dardized values of the variables or changes in the overall magnitude of 
the coefficients.39 
Implications for the interpretation of the KCFSI. The above find-
ings on the effects of extending the sample from June 2007 to March 
2009 support the use of benchmark episodes in determining whether 
financial stress is high in a particular month. If the standard deviation 
approach were used, the downward shift in the KCFSI shown in Chart 
B.1 for months with high values of KCFSI could cause some months to 
be reclassified from high-stress to low-stress. For example, if the cutoff 
were one standard deviation above the mean, the months December 
1990 and October 1999 would no longer be considered high-stress 42  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
months. The percentile method would be less subject to this problem. 
However, because most of the months added to the sample have very 
high values of KCFSI, using a percentile cutoff could also result in the 
reclassification of previous months from high-stress to low-stress. But 
suppose that the degree of stress in a particular month is determined 
by comparing that month to some benchmark month such as Octo-
ber 1998, when financial stress is known to have been high because of 
the Russian debt default and LTCM crisis. Then the classification of a 
month as high-stress would be less likely to change, because the KCFSI 
shifts down by similar amounts in all months in which the index was 
initially high.
Chart B.1















KCFSI estimated over 
February 1990 - June 2007
KCFSI estimated over 
February 1990 - March 2009
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ENDNOTES
1See Caballero and Krishnamurthy and Easley and O’Hara for examples of 
this view of financial crises. 
2In terms of Bayesian decision theory, the investor will revise his estimate of 
firm profitability by a greater amount, the higher is the signal-to-noise ratio—the 
higher is the precision of the signal relative to the precision of prior information 
about firm profitability. The precision of signals may decrease during a financial 
crisis—e.g., because changes in accounting practices make earnings announce-
ments harder to interpret. However, the precision of prior information is likely to 
decrease even more, causing signals to have a greater impact on stock prices.
3Asset markets in which investors base their actions on their expectations of 
other investors’ expectations have been modeled in two ways by economists. The 
first approach is to assume that each investor receives some private information 
about the fundamental value of the asset (Allen and others). The second approach is 
to assume that investors have common information but different beliefs (Kurz).
4A similar result would occur if the firms issuing the bonds were identical 
but investors could not observe how the firms were using the borrowed funds–
the case of moral hazard. In this situation, each firm might have an incentive to 
use the funds in ways that benefited the firm’s shareholders or managers at the 
expense of the bondholders. For example, the firm might make risky investments 
that mainly benefit shareholders if successful, but mainly hurt bondholders if 
unsuccessful. Realizing that firms have this incentive, bondholders would require 
a higher rate of interest on the bonds than if they could commit the firm to invest-
ing the funds in safer projects.
5Besides creating adverse selection, declines in collateral values can lead to 
moral hazard by giving borrowers more incentive to make risky investments or 
abscond with the funds. 
6Another way lenders and investors could lose confidence in the accuracy of 
their information about firms is through accounting scandals or relaxations in 
accounting standards. 
7In consumption-based asset pricing models, the compensation for bearing 
risk is referred to as the “price of risk.” In such models, two factors can cause 
the price of risk to rise: an increase in the rate at which marginal utility declines 
with consumption or a belief that future consumption growth has become more 
volatile (Cochrane). Some economists argue that the second factor is a more likely 
source of large and sudden shifts in the price of risk than the first factor (Gai and 
Vause, pp. 6-8, and Coudert and Gex, pp. 10-14). 
8In extreme cases of adverse selection, the market for an asset category can 
even break down completely, in which case even lower-quality assets cannot be 
sold to meet unexpected cash needs.44  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
9For example, in the event of liquidation, fund managers may be paid a fee that 
is proportional to the liquidation value of the fund. The higher is the volatility of 
asset prices, the greater is the chance that the value of the fund’s assets will fall below 
the threshold at which it has to be liquidated, and thus the more important it will be 
to the funds’ managers to have highly liquid assets on hand (Vayanos). 
10Default risk in the LIBOR market is often referred to as counterparty risk. 
For discussions of the relative roles of default risk and liquidity risk in boosting the 
LIBOR rate in the current crisis, see Kwan 2009 and Taylor and Williams.
11Some observers have questioned the accuracy of LIBOR on the grounds 
that banks in the panel could have an incentive to misreport their cost of borrow-
ing on the interbank market (Mollenkamp and Whitehouse). However, none of 
the results in this article are changed if the 3-month LIBOR rate is replaced in 
the KCFSI by the 3-month Eurodollar deposit rate, a rate that is very highly cor-
related with LIBOR but reflects actual transactions.
12Another source of risk is the possibility of default by a counterparty, but this risk 
exists on both sides of the swap, making the effect on the swap spread ambiguous.
13Most longer-term Treasury securities are issued once a quarter.
14The measure used for the off-the-run yield is the 10-year par yield from the 
off-the-run yield curve estimated by Gurkaynak and others.
15Bernanke and Gertler refer to the part of the yield spread due to informa-
tion asymmetry as the external finance premium.
16Recessions tend to cause much bigger increases in defaults on high-yield 
bonds than on Baa bonds. Thus, as in the case of the Baa/Aaa spread, an increase 
in the spread could in some cases reflect a well-founded change in investor expec-
tations about the economy rather than a flight to quality.
17The  methodology  is  essentially  the  same  as  in  Smirlock  and  Haq  and 
Heaney. 
18The  interquartile  range  is  the  difference  between  the  top  and  bottom 
quartiles. As a measure of dispersion, it has the advantage over the standard de-
viation of reducing the influence of extreme outliers. Apart from the use of the 
interquartile range, the calculation of dispersion in unexpected stock returns is 
similar to that in Cutler.
19The procedure may be described formally as follows. Let Xit be the value of 
the ith standardized variable in month t; let a1....a11 be a set of coefficients for the 
11 variables; let FSIt be the value of the financial stress index in month t; and let 
T be the number of months. The values {FSIt}and the coefficients {aK} are chosen 
to  minimize the sum of squared errors, SSE =
K t ΣΣ(XKt – aKFSIt)2, subject to the 
constraint
t Σ FSIt
2 /(T-1) = 1. As shown in Theil, the values of a1....a11 solving this 
problem are the elements of the first eigenvector of the sample correlation matrix 
of the 11 variables (Table 2). Also, FSIt= (a1/λ)X1t +....+ (a11/λ)X11t for all t, where ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  45
λ is the first eigenvalue for the sample correlation matrix. The coefficients in this 
expression are the ones reported in Table 3.                                                                                                                                             
20In terms of the previous endnote, the number in the last row of Table 3 is 
1– SSE/SST, where SST is the total sum of squares, ΣΣΧ
K t Kt
2 . When the coefficients 
are chosen as described in the previous endnote, this number equals the first 
eigenvalue of the sample correlation matrix divided by the number of variables in 
the index. See Theil for further details. 
21According to the expectations theory, the long-term Treasury yield should 
equal the average of expected future short-term yields. A tightening of monetary 
policy relative to long-run expectations tends to push the current short-term yield 
above expected future short-term yields. As a result, it also tends to increase the 
spread of the current short-term yield over the current long-term yield. 
22See Illing and Aaron for a more detailed review and assessment of the two 
kinds of financial stress indexes.
23Other events contributing to financial stress in 1990 included the failure of 
the investment bank, Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, a major player in the junk bond 
market, and commercial real estate losses at large regional banks such as the Bank 
of New England (Wolfson, pp. 127-137).
24For a more detailed review of the events of the crisis through the end of 
2008, see Brunnermeier. 
25These events are listed mainly to place the changes in KCFSI in context. 
With so many factors contributing to financial stress in the period, it is not pos-
sible to identify the precise causes of each monthly change in the index.
26Monoline insurers are companies that specialize in guaranteeing the timely 
repayment of bonds. 
27Lists of episodes of financial stress can be found in Bloom, Bordo, and Il-
ling and Liu. The last authors presented their colleagues at the Bank of Canada 
with a long list of episodes and asked them to rank them according to how stress-
ful they were for Canada. Given the high degree of integration of the U.S. and 
Canadian economies, one would expect many of the events that were stressful for 
Canada to also be stressful for the U.S.
28The IMF also treats episodes that are two or fewer quarters apart as the 
same episode.
29The source of the problem is that the sample standard deviation of a vari-
able is very sensitive to the addition of extreme values to the sample. As a result, 
more moderate values of the variable will represent fewer standard deviations 
from the mean in the new sample than in the original sample.
30For example, the KCFSI for October 1998 falls in the 90th percentile whether 
only data through June 2007 is used to calculate the index or data through March 
2009 is used. It should be noted, however, that with the percentile method, it is 
still possible for the classification of a month as stressful to change as the sample 
grows. Consider, for example, the month of December 1990, during the late 46  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
stages of the 1990-1991 recession. The index for that month is well above the 90th 
percentile using data through June 2007 but somewhat below the 90th percentile 
using data through March 2009.
31Another problem posed by sample changes is that the addition of new ob-
servations can alter past values of the index by changing either the estimated coef-
ficients on the variables or the standardized values of the variables. Appendix B 
presents evidence from the change in sample after June 2007 suggesting that such 
instability need not interfere with the use of the index to assess financial stress, 
as long as the benchmark method is used rather than the standard-deviation or 
percentile approach. 
32A detailed explanation of the CFNAI can be found on the Chicago Fed’s 
website. The index is constructed using principal components and draws on ex-
tensive research by James Stock and Mark Watson on the forecasting properties 
of such indexes. 
33These correlations are for the monthly KCFSI and CFNAI rather than the 
3-month moving averages shown in the chart.
34To compute the impulse response, some assumptions must be made about 
the contemporaneous relationship between KCFSI and CFNAI. Chart 5 assumes 
that within any month, a shock to CFNAI affects KSFSI, but a shock to KCFSI has 
no effect on CFNAI. While this ordering of the two variables seemed most plausi-
ble, the impulse response looks essentially the same when the ordering is reversed.
35Another way to assess the ability of the KCFSI to predict the CFNAI is by 
comparing the out-of-sample forecast errors from models using only lagged val-
ues of CFNAI to a model using both lagged values of KCFSI and lagged values of 
CFNAI. Preliminary analysis suggests that using information on KCFSI improves 
out-of-sample forecasts of CFNAI at some horizons but not others.
36The sources of change in the KCFSI can be formally identified by rewrit-
ing the expression for the FSI in endnote 19 as FSIt = (b1X1t + ....+ b11X11t)/λ1/2, 
where bK = aK /λ1/2 for all k. The parameters {bK} can be shown to satisfy ∑bKt
2 
= 1, which is equivalent to the eigenvector (b1 …. b11) having a length of one 
(Theil). Changes in λ1/2, the square root of the eigenvalue, correspond to changes 
in the overall magnitude of the coefficients on the variables. Changes in the unit-
length eigenvector (b1 …. b11) correspond to changes in the relative magnitudes 
of these coefficients. Finally, changes in the standardized values of the variables 
correspond to changes in {XKt}.
37The relative importance of the different sources of change in KCFSI was 
determined by doing a shift-share type decomposition of the change in the index 
for each month in the original sample. 
38In terms of endnote 36, the scale factor λ1/2 increases from 2.16 in the origi-
nal sample to 2.60 in the new sample, multiplying all the coefficients (and thus all 
the values of KCFSI in the original sample) by the factor .83. ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2009  47
39For non-overlapping periods of sufficient length, it is possible to test if 
differences in either the eigenvalues or the unit-length eigenvectors of a principal 
components model are statistically significant. See Perignon and Villa, who draw 
on earlier research by Flury. The period July 2007-March 2009 is too short to 
conduct such a test, but the test could be conducted by splitting the entire sample 
period into two parts, one of which includes the credit crisis.48  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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